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coint in a symposium commemorating AIS at the
' judicial independence-a sweeping topic with
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utions that IS has made to the administration of
st one hundred years can best be understood and
us to further the overarching objective of promoting
lependent and accountable judiciary
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Consortium. court reform movement of the past
i, but also the century. But that, in turn, implicates
-ople need to the challenge: In an era when good-
ierates infor- government organizations compete
dministration for scarce resources, getting noticed
rd to political can be the key to their survival. And
e. As a conse-
an indispens- .Many thanks to Anita Foss for her excelent- a
)Urce
getting noticed is not easy when
issues critical to the health of AJS are
often more tedious than titillating.
Thankfully, we need not dissemi-
nate "Dare to be Dour" buttons to
acknowledge AJS achievements. We
can tell the AJS story, in its centen-
nial year, through this series of arti-
cles. And that story is anything but
dreary, for it tells the tale of a small
organization with an unpronounce-
able name that has changed the face
of American justice.
A logical starting point in the
AJS story is with the issue of judi-
cial independence, a sweeping topic
with complex architecture that gives
structure to the AJS mission. "Judi-
cial" tethers independence to judges.
Judges can be conceptualized as
atomized individuals deciding cases
or as a group collectively comprising
the judicial branch of government. As
individuals, judges include a sprawl-
ing array of adjudicators-state,
federal, trial, and appellate. Their
jurisdictions range just as widely:
general and specialized; foreign
and domestic; Article I and Article
III. Collectively, the judiciary serves
a host of roles, as administrator,
rulemaker, disciplinarian, lobbyist,
spokesperson, and sometimes, invol-
untary scapegoat.
"Independence," in turn, is
defined as freedom from influence
or control, which implies unfet-
tered autonomy. "Judicial," however,
modifies independence in ways that
limit the word's construction with
reference to the purposes inde-
pendence serves individually and
collectively. In relation to judges
individually, independence arguably
insulates them from the influence
or control of interested outsiders
who could interfere with judges'
efforts to uphold the law, adhere to
due process, and reach just results
("decisional," or "decision-making"
independence).' As to judges col-
lectively, independence buffers the
judiciary from legislative or execu-
tive branch controls that could
encroach on the judiciary as a sepa-
rate branch of government or insti-
tution ("institutional," "branch," or
"administrative" independence).2
Unfettered judicial independence
does not serve these purposes.
Rather, absolute independence would
liberate judges to disregard the law,
due process, and justice, leaving
them accountable only to their own
preferences or priorities. And it could
morph the judiciary into an imperial,
rather than a coequal, branch of gov-
ernment by immunizing the judiciary
from the interdependency of checks
and balances. Independence, then,
must be qualified by accountabil-
ity, making the perennial challenge
to strike a balance in which judges
and the judiciary are independent
enough to serve the goals of indepen-
dence, but not so independent as to
undermine those same goals.
The century-old mission of AJS
has been to assist in striking this
independence-accountability balance
across a diverse array of initiatives.
Toward the end of the nineteenth
century, populists and progressives
ascended to power, winning elec-
tion to Congress and state legisla-
tures.' Unhappy with conservative
"Lochner era" judges who invalidated
their reforms, populists and progres-
sives agitated to curb decisional and
institutional independence.4 While
cycles of anti-court sentiment have
come and gone since the nation was
founded, the ferocity with which
courts were attacked during the pop-
ulist and progressive era represents a
high water mark.' In a first, one that
would become more commonplace
in the twentieth century, the Senate
rejected a Supreme Court nominee
(Stanley Matthews) because of his
political ideology, inferred from his
1. For a discussion of the decisional-institu-
tional independence dichotomy, see AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SEPARATION
OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 11-14
(1997); Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler,
Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Inde-
pendence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV.
835, 838 (1995); Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily
Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the judicial
Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
31, 31-32 (1998). For a discussion of the purposes
that judicial independence serves, see Charles
Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule ofLaw Survive Judicial
Politics?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 238-44 (2012).
2. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note
1, at 11-14; Bermant & Wheeler, supra note 2, at
838; Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 1, at 31-32;
Geyh, supra note 1, at 238-44.
3. William Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS,
PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT
THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (Princeton, NJ: Princ-
eton University Press 1994).
4. Id.
5. Charles Gardner Geyh, Roscoe Pound and the
Future of the Good Government Movement, 28 S.
TEx. L. REV. 871, 873 (2007).
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conservative economic affiliations.'
Congress, unhappy with the deci-
sions of the Commerce Court, abol-
ished it altogether.! Several western
states amended their constitutions to
include provisions for the removal of
judges via recall elections; when Pres-
ident Taft, who became a leader of AJS
during his subsequent tenure as Chief
Justice, threatened to block Arizona's
application for statehood unless it
removed such a provision. Arizona
did so, only to reinstate it after being
admitted to the union.' Numerous
proposals were introduced to end life
tenure for federal judges,9 to select
them by popular election,o to strip
them of jurisdiction to hear commer-
cial cases,"' and, in a number of states,
to end judicial review.2
In 1906, against the backdrop of
these developments, Roscoe Pound
delivered a keynote address to the
American Bar Association on the
"Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice.""
Five hallmarks of his address would
later be embraced by AJS, which he
helped to found seven years later.14
First, his approach was nonpartisan;
despite Pound's personal antipathy
toward the progressive agenda, his
address was notable for its balance.
Second, Pound's approach to criticism
of the courts was non-dismissive.
Third, his approach proceeded from
6. Henry Abraham, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS:
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE
SUPREME COURT 136 (3d ed. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press 1992) ("It was perhaps
the first clear instance of concerted, patent
opposition to a nominee on grounds of economic
affiliation.").
7. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 172-73 (New
Brunswick, NJ; Transaction Publishers 1927).
8. Joseph F. Zimmerman, PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY: POPULISM REVIVED 106 (Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan Press 1986).
9. M.A. Musmanno, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION 82 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office 1929).
10. Id., at 86.
11. Charles G. Geyh, WHEN COURTS & CON-
GRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF
AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 95- 96 (Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan Press 2006).
12. Ross, supra n. 3, at 48.
13. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dis-
satisfaction With the Administration ofJustice, 14
AM. L. REV 445 (1906).
14. Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the
50th Anniversary of Merit Selection, 74 JUDI-
CATURE 128, 128 (1990) ("While that speech
alone may not have been sufficient to prompt.,
the premise that preserving public
confidence in the courts was critical
to the judiciary's survival. Fourth, his
approach elaborated on four causes
and multiple sub-causes of dissatis-
faction with the justice system in a
systematic and deeply substantive
way. Fifth, Pound protected core judi-
cial independence values. By fixating
on procedural and organizational
remedies for popular unrest with the
courts, he rejected and deflected the
heavy-handed, independence-threat-
ening proposals of the progressives.
AJS was established in no small
part to carry on the work that Pound
began, in response to the populist-
progressive attack on the courts-an
attack that arguably presented the
greatest threat to judicial indepen-
dence in American history." To that
extent, judicial independence is AJS's
raison d'etre, and, in the intervening
years, AJS has devoted considerable
time and energy to this overarching
issue. In the late 1990s, it established a
Center for Judicial Independence that
hosted programs, engaged in coali-
tion building, and established a task
force to identify and address press-
ing issues on the national and state
scenes. AJS officers and staff have
published books, book chapters, and
articles on judicial independence"-
most notable, perhaps, being judicial
Independence at the Crossroads: An
[the establishment of] the American Judicature
Society.there is no doubt that [it] played a signif-
icant role along with other factors then present").
15. See supra n. 6 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Kevin Esterling, JUDICIAL INDE-
PENDENCE, PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN COURTS, AND
STATE-FEDERAL COOPERATION IN THE MIDWEST
(Chicago, IL: American Judicature Society 1998);
Frances Zemans, judicial Independence, in LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (Herbert M.
Kritzer, ed. 2002).
17. This project was co-sponsored byAJS.
18. Michael Belknap, To IMPROVE THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 33-34 (Chicago, IL:
American Judicature Society 1992).
19. Pound, supra n. 13.
20. American Judicature Society, Perspectives
on Court-Congress Relations: The View from the
Hill and the Federal Bench, 79 JUDICATURE 303
(1996); Editorial, Misguided Judicial Reform, 81
JUDICATURE 4 (1997); G. Gregg Webb & Keith E.
Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of
the Purse, and InherentJudicial Powers, 88 JUDI-
CATURE 12 (2004).
21. Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance
of Impropriety: With Great Power Comes Great
Responsibility, 89 JUDICATURE 35 (2005).
Interdisciplinary Approach, a ground-
breaking collection of essays edited
by AJS Board members Steve Burbank
and Barry Friedman."
The issues AJS has placed on its
agenda-the issues explored in this
issue of Judicature-can be under-
stood and explained with reference
to that common root: the organiza-
tion's commitment to an independent
and accountable judiciary. The para-
graphs that follow elaborate a bit.
Judicial Administration
and Access to Justice
In his 1906 address, Pound focused
his reform proposals on judicial orga-
nization and procedure. Like Pound,
AJS recognized from its inception that
independence-threatening dissatis-
faction with the courts is often attrib-
utable to poor administration, and
that a poorly-administered judiciary
squanders the good will that supports
independence because incompetence
lays independence to waste." When
court systems exercise inadequate
oversight; follow bad procedure or
good procedure badly; are poorly
structured, inadequately funded,
or understaffed, they delay or deny
access to the rule of law, due process,
and justice. That, in turn, begets
public disaffection that jeopardizes
the courts' legitimacy and invites
ham-handed intrusions upon the
judiciary's autonomy 9 via legislative
micromanagement of judicial admin-
istration or insensitivity to the judi-
ciary's budgetary needs-an issue
AJS has addressed in conferences,
editorials, and articles published in
Judicature.20
Judicial Conduct and Ethics
AJS has long understood that account-
ability is a critical counterpoint to
independence and that it thwarts
its abuse.2' The judiciary's contin-
ued independence requires the pub-
lic's support; if the public becomes
convinced that judges misuse the
independence they are afforded,
the obvious solution is to take that
independence away. The key is to
provide a measure of accountability
that curbs judicial excesses without
curbing independence in ways that
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compromise its objectives. One such
measure is to hold judges to stan-
dards of conduct that protect and
preserve judicial impartiality, integ-
rity, and independence.
The American Bar Association
contemplated a proposal to promul-
gate canons of judicial ethics within
three years of Roscoe Pound's
address, but it worried that such a
project could be misconstrued as
another attack on the courts at a
time when the judiciary's indepen-
dence hung by a thread." In its inau-
gural bulletin published in 1913,
AJS included judicial discipline as
a topic heading in an amalgam of
complaints and proposals aimed
at alleviating disaffection with the
courts.23 Push came to shove in
1920, when the federal judiciary was
rocked by a scandal involving Judge
Kennesaw Mountain Landis, who
became commissioner of baseball
without resigning from the court.14
After a period of study, the ABA
adopted the first Canons of Judi-
cial Ethics in 1924.25 Canon 14, cap-
tioned "independence," importuned
judges to disregard attacks akin to
those they had recently weathered,
declaring that judges "should not be
swayed by partisan demands, public
clamor or considerations of per-
sonal popularity or notoriety, nor be
apprehensive of unjust criticism." In
1977, five years after the ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct was pro-
mulgated, AJS founded the Center
for Judicial Conduct Organizations,
later renamed the Center for Judicial
Ethics, which has become a leading
source of information and authority
on ethics issues.26 The Center pub-
lishes the quarterly Judicial Conduct
Reporter, provides an information
service and technical assistance to
state judicial conduct and disciplin-
ary entities, sponsors the biennial
National College on Judicial Conduct
and Ethics, lends expertise to ABA
Model Code revision projects, and
serves as an indispensable resource
to scholars, judges, and practitioners.
State Judicial Selection
Among the causes of popular dissat-
isfaction with the courts enumer-
ated in Roscoe Pound's 1906 address
to the American Bar Association
was "putting judges into politics"-
a pointed reference to judicial
elections.27 After 1789, when the
Constitution was ratified, governors
or legislatures appointed judges in
all thirteen states." In the 1840s, a
wave of states moved toward select-
ing judges in contested partisan
elections; at the turn of the twenti-
eth century, some states moved to
select judges in contested nonpar-
tisan elections.2 9 Appointive and
contested election systems were
variously criticized for rendering
judges too dependent on governors,
legislatures, political party bosses,
the vagaries of name recognition,
and the whims of a poorly-informed
electorate."o To promote judicial
independence from these sources of
political influence, AJS proposed to
reorient the focus of judicial selec-
tion toward qualifications, with a
merit selection plan devised in 1913
by AJS co-founder Albert Kales.3 '
Pursuantto theAJS plan, judges were
to be appointed by governors from
commission-approved candidate
pools; if states wished, they could
add periodic, uncontested retention
elections in which incumbents must
win majority voter support in order
to keep their seats." Beginning with
Missouri in 1940, 23 states adopted
some version of the AJS merit selec-
tion plan during the mid-twentieth
century (with all but Hawaii adding
22. As the principal drafter of the Canons
would later explain: "[T]he agitation for recall
of the judiciary and recall of judicial decisions"
was such that "it was not deemed wise to add
fuel to that flame by intimating through the
adoption of Canons of Judicial Ethics that the
judiciary were in fault." Quoted in John P. MacK-
enzie, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 182 (1974)
23. Belknap, supra n. 18, at 38-39.
24. Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public
Confidence in the Courts in an Age of Individual
Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH-PRESS:
THE COLLISION OF THE COURTS, POLITICS AND THE
MEDIA (Keith Bybee ed. 2007).
25. Id.
26. Belknap, supra n. 18, at 232.
27. Pound, supra n. 13.
28. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial
Selection Debate and Why it Matters for Judicial
Independence, 21 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259,
1261 (2008).
29. Id., at 1261-62.
30. Id., at 1262.
31. Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel,
a retention election component) to
select some or all of their judges."
AJS and its Elmo B. Hunter Citi-
zens' Center for Judicial Selection
have served as a resource for anyone
curious about judicial selection in
the United States. The Center has
advised jurisdictions contemplat-
ing reform, participated in programs
hosted by others, hosted programs of
its own, published indispensable data
on selection systems, and advocated
merit selection as preferable to more
independence-threatening contested
election systems." And Judicature
has published scores of articles on the
topic." In short, judicial selection and
its relationship to judicial indepen-
dence has been a centerpiece of the
AJS agenda from the beginning.
Federal Judicial Selection
Judicial selection wars have not
been confined to state systems.
Supreme and circuit court confirma-
tion proceedings transformed into
referenda on nominee ideology over
the course of the twentieth century,
where once again, judicial indepen-
dence was at the front and center.16
Inquiring into a nominee's judicial
philosophy is one thing; so called
"litmus" tests, in which the Senate
conditions a nominee's confirma-
tion on whether she will effectively
commit to deciding future issues
in politically acceptable ways, is
another that arguably cuts to the
quick of decisional independence.
Introduction, JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 7
(Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds. 1993)
32. For a summary of the activities of the AJS
Elmo B. Hunter Center on Judicial Selection, see
http://ajs.org/selection/index.asp
33. Geyb, supra n. 28, at 1262.
34. For a summary of the activities of the AJS
Elmo Hunter Center on Judicial Selection, see
http://ajs.org/selection/index.asp
35. See, e.g., Owen G. Abbe & Paul S. Herrnson,
How Judicial Election Campaigns Have Changed,
85 JUDICATURE 286 (2002); Damon Cann, Beyond
Accountability and Independence: Judicial Selec-
tion and State Court Performance, 90 JUDICATURE
226 (2007); C. Scott Peters, Canons, Cost, and
Competitions in State Supreme Court Elections,
91 JUDICATURE 27 (2007). This list is by no
means complete. State judicial selection is one of
the most common categories in the JUDICATURE
subject index.
36. Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege &
Power: The Senate's Role in the Appointment of
Federal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24 (2002); Geyh,
supra note 11, at 198-208, 212-22.
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Criminal Justice
When judges preside over crimi-
nal cases, they wield an awesome
power over an individual's life and
liberty, and the decisions they make
can have a significant effect on their
community's safety and peace of
mind. Unsurprisingly, then, criminal
justice issues are often at the center
of the most heated independence-
accountability debates." Two of the
primary catalysts for the latest cycle
of anti-court sentiment that began
in the mid-nineties, discussed at the
end of this article, concerned crimi-
nal justice issues. In 1996, House
and Senate Republicans threatened
federal district judge Harold Baer
with impeachment after he ruled to
suppress evidence in a drug case." In
1998, Tennessee Justice Penny White
lost her retention election because
she joined an opinion overturn-
ing a defendant's death sentence."
The choices judges make in crimi-
nal cases provoke threats to judicial
independence and call for greater
accountability because those choices
are enormously important. For that
reason, criminal justice issues have
long been on the AJS agenda.40
Jury Reform
The jury system arose as a check
on judicial power.41 The decisional
independence judges enjoy to decide
cases without external interference
is limited by juries that play a criti-
cal role in deciding the fate of parties
coming before the court. Jury trials
are increasingly rare-a potentially
troubling development-but they
remain a shotgun behind the door
that influences the ways lawyers liti-
gate and judges preside, even when
37. American Judicature Society, Issues injudi-
cial Independence and Accountability, 88 JUDICA-
TURE 114 (2004).
38. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra n. 1,
at 15-16.
39. Kirk Loggins & Duren Cheek, Activists
Target Tennessee judge, THE TENNESSEAN, July
1, 1998, at Al.
40. For example, the AJS has established
a Center for Forensic Science and Public
Policy. See Center for Forensic Science and
Public Policy Home Page, AMERICAN JUDICA-
TURE SOCIETY, http://www.ajs.org/index.php/
judicial-administration/fs/ (last visited May
23, 2013).
41. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A
Brief History of CriminalJury in the United States,
IN SHORT, EVERY ISSUE IN THE AJS PORTFOLIO
IMPLICATES JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN IMPORTANT WAYS.
cases culminate in settlement or
negotiated pleas. Given the continu-
ing importance of the jury system,
AJS established the National Jury
Center, later renamed the Edmund N.
"Ned" Carpenter II jury Center, which
conducts applied research on jury
system management and citizens'
views of jury service; gathers and
disseminates information on jury
systems; and promotes adoption and
standardization of best practices in
state and federal courts.4 1
In short, every issue in the AJS
portfolio implicates judicial inde-
pendence and accountability in
important ways. In addition to its
programmatic agenda, however, AJS
has arguably exerted an even more
profound impact on the course of
the judicial independence debate
through its journal, Judicature, as
evidenced by its role in the most
recent cycle of anti-court sentiment.
In the 1994 midterm elections,
the Republican Party gained control
of both houses of Congress. House
Republicans, elected on the strength
of a "Contract with America" that
proposed sweeping administrative
and public policy reforms, quickly
61 U. Cm. L. REv. 867, 871-872 (1994).
42. MarkW. Bennet, Judges' Views on Vanishing
Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE 306 (2005); Valerie
P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Verdict on juries, 91
JUDICATURE 226 (2008).
43. Information on the AJS center is avail-
able at; http://www.ajs.org/index.php/
judicial-administration/jury-center/.
44. See supra n. 28.
45. For a discussion of these events, see
Charles Geyh, The Choreography of Courts-Con-
gress Conflicts in THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDE-
PENDENCE 19 (Bruce Peabody ed., 2011).
46. For a discussion of these events, see GEYH,
supra note 11, at 213-22 (appointments), 268-75
(limits on sentencing discretion and special leg-
islation in the Schlavo case).
became impatient with judges whose
decisions were at odds with the
new agenda. In the Senate, major-
ity leader Robert Dole was poised to
become the Republican Party's presi-
dential nominee, and he made liberal
"judicial activism" a campaign issue.
As noted earlier, the Baer episode in
1996 lit the fuse: Senator Dole and
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich
called for Baer's impeachment if he
did not reverse a suppress order he
had issued in a pending drug case.
President Clinton, through his press
secretary, indicated that he would
ask Baer to resign if he did not
reverse himself, and Baer reversed
himself.4 4
Between 1996 and 2008 (when
the Democrats regained control
of the House, Senate, and White
House), members of Congress pro-
posed, and in some cases imple-
mented, a host of mechanisms to
curb what they regarded as "liberal
judges run amok." They threatened
to impeach "activist" judges; deprive
federal courts of jurisdiction to
hear cases on politically sensitive
issues; disestablish or restructure
"activist" courts (particularly the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals); and
freeze budgets." And they thwarted
the appointment of liberal circuit
judges; imposed restrictions on
sentencing discretion; and, in one
instance, created special jurisdic-
tion for a federal court to review
an unpopular state court ruling.46
While this cycle featured conserva-
tive politicians attacking liberal(ish)
judges, the propensity to attack
ideologically adverse judges is not
confined to a particular party or
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Retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Former Arizona Chieffustice Ruth McGregor, and Wisconsin Chief
Justice Shirley Abrahamson participate in a 2005 discussion on judicial independence and impartiality.
ideology. Recall that during the pop-
ulist-progressive era, the shoe was
on the other foot when progressives
attacked conservatives. Moreover,
between 2000 and 2008, Senate
Democrats (who regained majority
control for part of that time) used a
range of tactics to delay or kill the
conservative circuit court nomina-
tions of President George W. Bush."
In state court systems, judicial
elections have become "noisier,
nastier, and costlier."48 Numerous
supreme court races morphed into
referenda on a judicial candidate's
vote in a single case or view on an
isolated issue. Examples include
matters such as capital punishment
and criminal sentencing, gay mar-
riage, water rights, abortion, funding
of public education, and tort reform."
Driven by an ideological divide over
tort reform, money poured into
supreme court races in unprec-
edented amounts, fueling concerns
that judges would be beholden to
their contributors.so In other devel-
opments, court budgets were cut,
sometimes as a retaliatory strike for
unpopular decisions or as a matter
of recession-related fiscal austerity,
implicating both decisional and insti-
tutional independence." In various
states, unwelcome decisions by indi-
vidual judges led to calls for impeach-
ment, discipline, recall, removal by
legislative address, restrictions on
jurisdiction and judicial review, and,
remarkably, exposure to criminal
prosecution."
During this cycle of anti-court
anger, judicature has covered judicial
independence issues in five ways.
First, it has kept readers abreast of
events as they arise: When the latest
cycle of anti-court sentiment began
in earnest in the mid-nineties at the
state and federal levelsJudicature ran
articles that reported the develop-
ments and published transcriptions
of AJS conferences that summarized
and analyzed events implicating
judicial independence concerns as
they arose.S3 Second, judicature has
47. Id., at 217-20.
48. Roy Schotland, Elective judges' Campaign
Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's
Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J. L. & POL.
57 (1985).
49. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Criticism and
Speech ofJudges in the United States,in JUDICIA-
RIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 257, 265-66
(H.P. Lee ed., 2011).
50. Id., at 266.
51. Id., at 264.
52. Id., at 264-65. See also James Alfini, Jeffrey
Shaman, Steven Lubet & Charles Geyh, JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS §§ 15.01-15.07 (4th ed.
2007) (discussing removal mechanisms for state
judges, including recent developments).
53. See, e.g., JoanneAlbertsen & Malia Reddick,
Conference Considers Judicial Reform, 92 JUDICA-
TURE 80 (2008); American Judicature Society,
supra n. 37; American Judicature Society, The
Legacy ofRepublican Party ofMinnesota v. White,
91 JUDICATURE 135 (2007); American Judicature
Society, What is judicial Independence?, 80 JunI-
CATURE 73 (1996); Jon 0. Newman, The Judge
Baer Controversy, 80 JUDICATURE 156 (1997);
Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention
Elections Lessons from the Defeat ofJustices Lan-
phier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68 (1999).
54. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and
published articles placing this latest
cycle of court-directed animus in his-
torical perspective.5 4 Third, before
the cycle began, it published edito-
rials and advocacy pieces proposing
reforms and exhorting the public,
policy-makers, and judges to respect
the judiciary's independence."
Fourth, it has placed judicial inde-
pendence in comparative perspec-
tive by publishing work analyzing
independence and accountability in
foreign court systems.s6 Fifth, it has
engaged the scholarly debate regard-
ing the potential upsides to judicial
elections.17
the Present ofludicial Independence, 80 JUDICA-
TURE 117 (1996); Barry Friedman, Attacks on
Judges and Why They Fail, 81 JUDICATURE 150
(1998).
55. See, e.g., Editorial, The Crisis in the Immi-
gration Courts, 95 JUDICATURE 56 (2011); Kevin
M. Esterling, Public Outreach: The Cornerstone of
Judicial Independence, 82 JUDICATURE 112 (1998);
Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We
Care About Independent and Accountable Judges?,
84 JUDICATURE 58 (2000); Terry B. Friedman,
The Politicization of the Judiciary, 82 JUDICATURE
6 (1998); Steve Leben & Kevin Burke, Judicial
Independence:A New Threatfrom Within, 95 JUDI-
CATURE 205 (2012); Penny J. White, An America
Without judicial Independence, 80 JUDICATURE
174 (1997).
56. See, e.g., James Meernik, Rosa Aloisi & Jen-
nifer Ding, Judicial Decision Making at the ICTY
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Looking ahead, the latest cycle of
court-curbing rhetoric has wound
down at the federal level (with
the glaring exception of judicial
appointments), but much remains
to be done on judicial indepen-
dence and accountability among
the states. Political polarization,
judicial selection wars, shrinking
budgets, big money in judicial elec-
tion campaigns, angry legislatures,
determined interest groups, and
changing media coverage of the
courts are among a multitude of
factors that will drive the hotly con-
tested judicial independence and
accountability debate deep into the
twenty-first century.
The starting point is to transcend
the gaseous pronouncements upon
which the legal establishment's
longstanding arguments for judi-
cial independence are based. Judges
and lawyers often proceed from
the unexamined premise that judi-
cial independence is an instrumen-
tal value that promotes the rule of
the law; the balance of their time is
then spent arguing that different
impingements upon judicial inde-
pendence-threats of impeachment,
recall, jurisdiction-stripping, defeat
in contested or retention elections,
budget cuts, disestablishment of
courts, etc.-are axiomatically bad.
But social scientists have shown that
independent judges can be influ-
enced by more than law; they can be
influenced by ideology, race, gender,
emotions, strategic considerations,
and other factors. To date, schol-
ars-particularly political scientists
who have developed the attitudinal
model of judicial decision-making-
have studied extralegal influences
on decision-making by the U.S.
Supreme Court, to the virtual exclu-
sion of state courts.Judicature is well
positioned to encourage the prolif-
eration of scholarship that explores
the range of influences upon judicial
decision-making on state trial and
appellate courts.
Armed with data that elucidates
the range of legal and extra-legal
influences on state judicial decision-
making, AJS will be well-positioned
to reassess the normative justifica-
tions for judicial independence. If
independent judges are liberated to
do more or less than uphold the law,
to what extent should traditional jus-
tifications for judicial independence
be reconsidered? If independent
state judges are influenced by their
ideological predilections, rather
than or in addition to the law, does
that mean independence is undesir-
able? Or can one defend the indepen-
dence of a judiciary that is subject
to legal and extralegal influences?
For example, can one argue that
independent judges are better situ-
ated to respect due process, to give
us their best assessment of what the
law requires, or to reach decisions
they regard as just given the facts of
the case-even if those decisions are
influenced by their ideological predi-
lections?
Once we know more about the
influences on independent state
courts and revise our justifications
for judicial independence accord-
ingly, it will be possible to formulate
an action plan. The optimal indepen-
dence-accountability balance should
promote judicial independence in a
way that furthers its desirable effects
while curbing the undesirable ones.
The merits of legislative or execu-
tive branch constraints on judicial
decision-making, electoral account-
ability and privately funded judicial
races, and the discipline or removal
of judges for conduct related to their
decision-making must be reassessed
against this yardstick.
If AJS is to remain a key player in
this project, itmusttackle the paradox
introduced in this article. On the one
hand, it must continue to embrace its
inner geek. It must remain devoted
to the issues that matter most to the
effective and expeditious adminis-
tration of justice, even-and perhaps
especially-when those issues are
seen as sexy or cool to no one except
lonely policy wonks, for that is where
AJS's unique expertise, perspective,
and time-tested commitment are
most needed. On the other hand, AJS
must do more to attract attention in
an era when charitable dollars often
flow to those who grab headlines. In
short, AJS must make itself famous
while toiling in obscurity.
This paradox, however, is not
inescapable. Ethics and selection are
marquee issues for AJS-issues that
routinely receive national atten-
tion. In the last five years alone,
the national media has covered
such issues as binding the Supreme
Court to a code of conduct; disquali-
fication of Supreme Court justices;
the Caperton case and its implica-
tions for recusal reform, campaign
finance, and judicial selection; the
impeachment and removal of a
federal judge for unethical conduct;
and the retention-election ouster
of three Iowa Supreme Court jus-
tices following their decision in a
same-sex marriage case. An ener-
gized, opportunistic, and strategi-
cally-minded AJS would be poised
to assume a more prominent lead-
ership role on these issues relative
to other interested organizations.
The resulting attention AJS receives
can create funding opportunities
for hot-button projects that beget
funding opportunities for vital, if
less prominent, initiatives.
Talk is cheap for a tenured law
professor with a steady income.
The challenge AJS confronts is more
complicated and daunting than my
simple, if not simplistic, recipe for
success makes it out to be. Phil-
anthropic organizations with the
desire and wherewithal to improve
the administration of justice in the
United States can learn more about
how AJS has helped to frame the
public debate over the course of the
last century from the articles that
follow. The choices those organiza-
tions make will then decide whether
AJS remains a vital participant in
that debate for the next hundred
years. Here's hoping they do the
right thing. *
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